Comments on: meillassoux vs. hallward vs. brown

By: Nick

Nick — Thu, 20 Nov 2008 01:57:36 +0000

That’s fair enough – I don’t get the sense that anyone’s dismissing Meillassoux’s entire work either. I think my problem (which really isn’t a problem, per se) with the criticisms is that pointing out what someone hasn’t talked about yet isn’t very useful. Better (and much harder!) is to say, “OK he’s missing these aspects, now how might we resolve that?” So I think my problem is just that the criticisms have tended to be solely negative, and not constructive.

I think you’re absolutely right that the in-itself need not be non-relational (a problem I have with Laruelle/Brassier as well). And physics is fascinating – I only wish I knew enough to speak intelligently about it. There’s some really important ontological aspects to it, I think, but I couldn’t even pretend to have an idea of how mathematics and physics are interrelated in things like string theory.

Anyways as much as some of this is silly arguments (is it OK to criticize someone about something they haven’t written??), I think it’s also really useful in delving into Meillassoux’s constructive project. Everyone’s aware of the internal critique of correlationism now, but where does Meillassoux go from there, and can it withstand criticism? I don’t think that’s been discussed enough yet.

By: Anthony Paul Smith

Anthony Paul Smith — Thu, 20 Nov 2008 01:36:33 +0000

As near as I can tell no one is criticizing him in any strong sense. Hallward’s review is not entitled anything like “why we shouldn’t read Meillassoux”. People are merely pointing out that there are some rather huge unanswered questions. That’s criticism of a kind, but it’s couched in a lot of affirming statements about After Finitude. I for one think that Meillassoux’s project is flawed in that it he already loads the dice, so to speak, by giving his definition of any thing-in-itself as the thing “independently of its relation to me”; everything in his argument follows on from this presupposition. It isn’t at all clear to me that a realist ontology demands that the thing-in-itself is this non-relational thing. I think Hallward’s point here about mathematics is actually very helpful, and I would point out that a great deal of contemporary physics wouldn’t need to go that far in order to think a thing (accurately, as you say). Of course, it is a very interesting little book, and I found it helpful for convincing me I was wrong on a few things. Yet, I’m really surprised at the fury with which people get upset when people make such criticisms. After all, it’s a rather short essay! Yet Dr. Brown is quite derisive towards those that disagree with him when all that was really called for was a much quieter rebuke.

By: Nick

Nick — Thu, 20 Nov 2008 00:33:36 +0000

Anthony, while you’re right it’s about consequences, I think where Hallward’s critique is going wrong (w/r/t to politics) is in drawing consequences from a incomplete philosophical system. Meillassoux states up front that his project is to understand how it can be that mathematics can have such a grasp on reality – e.g. how can physics be so accurate? (AF, 26) His initial steps (which is all that I take After Finitude to be) are to set the foundations for a mathematical ontology. He never, however, actually finishes the project in AF; he only breaks through a few traditional barriers to it. And if Meillassoux’s ultimate goal is to explain scientific statements, then he’s not doing away with causality or effective action. What he has to do now, though, is explain how he can get from necessary contingency to the structured situations of the phenomenal world. To be honest, I find it hard to believe that he’ll be able to do that, but I don’t think it’s valid to criticize him for it before he’s even tried.

By: Anthony Paul Smith

Anthony Paul Smith — Wed, 19 Nov 2008 23:49:35 +0000

Yeah, it’s totally ridiculous to critique a philosophy based on its consequences. Like what Meillassoux does w/r/t correlationism. What a laugh! As is trying to think about the implications of radical contingency for causality. Philosophy? More like sma-losophy! Am I right? LMFAO.

By: Nathan Brown

Nathan Brown — Wed, 19 Nov 2008 16:34:19 +0000

“And if Meillassoux holds a position of absolute contingency, doesn’t it leave us waiting for political novelty to happen, rather than providing a way towards developing the sort of ‘transformational materialism’ that Hallward seems to be aiming for?”

I have to say that I continue to find this argument hilarious. Is it really plausible that one might close After Finitude and think to oneself: “well, now that I’m convinced of absolute contingency, I’ll drop or defer any political engagements since this hyper-chaos I’ve just read about will, eventually, take care of my concerns on my behalf”? Immigration reform? Communist revolution? I’m waiting for Absolute Time to push those through.

Isn’t this rather ludicrous?

The argument that Peter makes, and that you second, may well apply to Badiou. But again – it has nothing whatsoever to do with After Finitude. Meillassoux does not offer a general theory of change or transformation. He forwards an argument for the general possibility of contingent transformation. The subjective consequences that you draw from that argument simply do not follow.

Faulting Meillassoux for “failing” to offer a theory of the subject or of political transformation in AF is bit like faulting Stephen Mumford for the fact that his 2004 book, _Laws in Nature_, doesn’t offer a theory of political transformation.